The Challenge of Successful Post-Conflict Nation- and Peace-Building: NATO's Role and Potential

The following analysis was published by the Duesseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy (DIAS), a foreign policy think tank at the Heinrich Heine University of Duesseldorf, on 9/1, 2006. Please see: DIAS-online.org

The Challenge of Successful Post-Conflict Nation- and Peace-Building: NATO's Role and Potential

This paper explores NATO’s increasing role in post-conflict peace- and nation-building, a process that started in the 1990s with peacekeeping missions in the Balkans (IFOR, SFOR and KFOR). At the beginning of the 21st century, that process has continued in the form of out-of-area missions in Afghanistan and a common NATO role for Iraq. The paper also takes into account NATO’s humanitarian operations, be they logistical support for the African Union (AU) in Darfur, Sudan, or flying aid to Kashmir in the aftermath of a devastating earthquake.[1] Does NATO have the potential to steadily develop into a permanent stand-by force to the United Nations for UN peacekeeping based on chapter 7 of its charter?[2]

Another important aspect refers to the theoretical challenges for successful nation- and peace-building after both, man-made and natural disasters.[3] Important questions in that regard are how to create lasting stability?[4] How to enable a viable peace, and thus ‘win the peace’?[5]

1. The Theory of Peace- and Nation-Building: ‘Old Issues’ Re-Visited

Which lessons should and could have been learned from post-conflict peacekeeping and peace-building in the Balkans in the 1990s?[6] Jock Covey, Michael Dziedzic and Leonard Hawley observe that the commanders of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) believed it to be “essential to the effectiveness of their mission and the security of their own troops that the former warring parties see the international military as an honest broker aloof from politics”.[7] However, neutrality vis-à-vis all parties in a post-conflict situation seems to pose a dilemma, as NATO learned in the second half of the 1990s, especially when dealing with so-called obstructionists to a peace process.[8]

For instance, when faced with a possible coup by former Serb member of Bosnia’s joint presidency, Momcilo Krajisnik, against Biljana Plavsic, the then President of the Republic of Srpska from 1996 to 1998, “Washington proposed to NATO headquarters in Brussels that it adopt a more rigorous standard: support the peace process and oppose those who seek to obstruct it. Within hours, this simple rule of thumb was translated into the SFOR commander’s intent and passed down to subordinate units. This new concept immediately legitimated the role of SFOR in preventing Momcilo Krajisnik’s coup against Biljana Plavsic”.[9] While Plavsic’s record before and during the war had been “unenviable”, her post intervention role was constructive. After the change in policy it had become “clear to all concerned – would-be spoilers as well as risk-averse commanders – that the international military would no longer be neutral about the peace process”. Covey concludes that “the importance of this seemingly small conceptual adjustment” could not be overestimated. In that sense, when the international community led by NATO went into Kosovo, “most military commanders and civilian officials understood their roles under UN Security Council Resolution 1244: the mission would be evenhanded with those who basically cooperated with the peace implementation process and would actively oppose those who obstructed it”.[10]

How crucial the adaptation of security and defense policy is, so that diverse actors, whether national governments, alliances or international organizations can meet the threats of the 21st century, is discussed in yet another late publication on post-conflict peace-building.[11] The editors conclude, that “military and police forces play a crucial role in the long-term success of political, economic and cultural rebuilding efforts in post-conflict societies. Yet, while charged with the long-term task of providing a security environment conducive to rebuilding war-torn societies, internal security structures tend to lack civilian and democratic control, internal cohesion and effectiveness, and public credibility. They must be placed under democratic control and restructured and retrained to become an asset, not a liability, in the long-term peace-building process. External actors from other nations, regional organizations and the United Nations can be of assistance in this process, by creating a basic security environment, preventing remnants of armed groups from spoiling the fragile peace-building process, and by facilitating reform of the local security sector”.

It seems the fragile situation both in Iraq and Afghanistan today highlight the challenges outlined above. Furthermore, after the United Nations Security Council agreed on UN resolution 1701, which calls for an international peace force to boost UNIFIL troops already in Southern Lebanon, Lebanon is about to become yet another test-case!

So, is there a way for the international community to measure progress in stabilization and reconstruction?

A special report published by United States Institute for Peace in March 2006 provides some preliminary conclusions and recommendations how to “assess success of efforts to stabilize and reconstruct failed states”.[12] The government of the United States was “facing enormous challenges in stabilizing nations emerging from conflict. After months of experience in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, reconstruction and stabilization operations are still plagued by persisting problems. While adequate national and international mechanisms have been developed to address some aspects of these interventions, such as conducting elections, coordinating the return of refugees, and privatizing state enterprises – reconstruction and stabilization so far have produced mixed results in other essential areas”.[13] The following steps should help the United States to keep building its stabilization and reconstruction capacity: First, the US government should invest in developing the capacity to measure progress in all stabilization and reconstruction operations; second, measures used to assess progress should be public and transparent, and the task of measuring should focus on actions of independent external actors and an internal metrics office that is attached to mission planning; third, decision makers should allocate adequate resources for assessing progress and integrate the results into the stabilization and reconstruction process.[14]

In the words of Robert Perito “as the war on terrorism progresses, US ability to establish sustainable security in post-conflict societies will become more important, not less”.[15] Even before September 11, 2001, the Pentagon had begun “planning to reshape the US military to address a range of new contingencies”. The defense review in that sense reflected “an emphasis on homeland defense against asymmetrical threats from international terrorism; cyber-warfare; transnational organized crime; illicit trafficking in drugs, weapons, and people; and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”.[16] However, the United States needed to project is power “in a manner that ensures the rapid restoration of stability and the creation of an environment conducive to post-conflict reconciliation and reconstruction”.[17] To deal with rogue states and international terrorism, the United States would require “new forces and a new approach to post-conflict intervention. It must maintain its war-fighting ability while becoming more adept at integrating civilian actors and processes. The mission of the military remains one of providing overall security; yet in post-conflict environments, civilian actors also have critical roles to play in achieving sustainable security”.[18]

As a consequence, should any ‘exit strategy’ for the US military be based on the principle that external troops can leave a country once a peaceful society is left behind?[19] For the US military in particular, but also for the military of other allies involved in international crisis management, does it take both, winning a war and the peace, to achieve victory?

In 1997, Allen Holmes concluded that, “during Operation Desert Storm, our special operations forces supported a major coalition combat operation for the first time since their reconstitution. Our civil affairs forces were critical during the post-conflict phase of Desert Storm in assisting the Kuwaiti government to restore essential services going to the people of Kuwait and to reestablish its authority... During IFOR, the focus of civil affairs was on peacekeeping operations and small community projects in areas in which troops were deployed. With the deployment of the stabilization force, or SFOR, there has been a change in focus to national-level objectives. To that end, SFOR uses the civil-military task force as its primary interface with the civilian establishment in promoting the economic regeneration and rebuilding of the country, in promoting returns of refugees and in attempting to build lasting institutions for peace. The task force, which is being led by a US commander, has been involved in literally hundreds of major projects in support of SFOR and in furtherance of civil implementation of the Dayton accord. Our recent experiences illustrate an increasing possibility that the US military will be called upon to participate in more complex, nontraditional operations – ones that involve close interaction with other US government agencies, nongovernmental, international organizations and our allies. Thus, the work that we have done in the past truly points the way toward the future security environment that we will face”.”[20]

What concerns lessons learned from previous operations, especially concerning the enforcement of the rule of law, the training of national police and the use of international police, Perito concludes that the use of “an international constabulary and police force” in the Balkans had been “painful but instructive”, while NATO multinational specialized units (MSUs) had been used sparingly.[21] “This has resulted from misunderstandings on the part of SFOR and KFOR commanders of their proper role and mission. Military commanders generally were unfamiliar with constabulary forces and assumed the MSUs were part of SFOR’s strategic reserve, a ‘riot squad’ that should be called only when needed. They failed to appreciate that the MSUs could perform a broad range of functions, including proactive patrolling, providing area security, and collecting intelligence. Problems with language and the absence of common doctrine also impeded efforts to use the MSUs more effectively. Commanders were unaware that the MSUs were subject to the same rules of engagement as other NATO forces. These units did not have executive authority and could not engage in law enforcement. This created additional misunderstandings within the military and between the MSUs, UN CIVPOL, and local police. As experienced law enforcement professionals in their own countries, members of the various MSU contingents, particularly the Italians, were frustrated by their lack of police powers and routinely exceeded their authority. In Kosovo, the MSU practice of detaining suspects and seizing contraband and then attempting to turn them over to the UN police was a source of constant friction between the two organizations. The civilian UN Special Police Units in Kosovo fared better than their military counterparts, but many of the problems encountered by these units were the same…”[22]

Two important questions can be deducted from the previous deliberations: First, which conclusions precisely could have been drawn from crisis management in Bosnia and Kosovo and used for the planning of the post-war period in Iraq? Second, which lessons does the NATO experience in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s and in Iraq and Afghanistan in the new century, provide for future crisis interventions, such as potentially in Southern Lebanon?

Perito makes a strong argument in favor of a US Stability Force. Such a force would have the full capacity to face so-called modern-day war, including the deployment of troops and the use of intelligence, presence, movement, observation, and intimidation to influence events. “With the inclusion of military, constabulary, police, and judicial personnel, this force would in fact have full-spectrum capability to enforce peace and to maintain stability through the introduction of the rule of law…”[23] The creation of a US Stability Force would “join together all of the elements required to effectively achieve sustainable security under a single, unified authority; close the security gap that has plagued previous peace operations by providing for a smooth transition from war-fighting to institution building; establish police and judicial authority from the outset, thus freeing the military to perform its functions and speeding the withdrawal of military forces; establish the rule of law as a platform from which the other aspects of political, economic, and social reconstruction could go forward in an environment conducive to achieving success; provide the United States with a force that could join with similar forces organized by the European Union, the OSCE, and other regional organizations; allow the United States to support much-needed UN reform by contributing a force that could assist the United Nations in meeting its responsibilities for international peacekeeping as envisioned in the Brahimi Report…”[24]

How essential the provision of immediate security in any post-conflict setting is, can be highlighted by the following thoughts.

During a personal interview in 2000, Jane Holl emphasized three major phases during a post-conflict transition process: the so-called transformation, stabilization and normalization phase. Three major objectives needed to be addressed during all of the three phases. Those objectives were security, well-being and justice. During an initial transformation phase, directly in the aftermath of violent conflict and war, meeting the security objective meant to “eliminate mass violence and establish a safe and security environment”.[25] During a second stabilization phase, security meant to “develop legitimate and stable security institutions”.[26] A third normalization phase would then “consolidate security institutions”. With regard to the second objective of well-being, during the transformation phase, the aim was “to stop the dying and restore essential services”; whereas the second stabilization phase should “restart the economic base (such as local market activity).”[27] Third, the normalization phase’s purpose was about the formulation and pursuit of a development program. With regard to the third objective of justice, the transformation phase would ideally “eliminate torture and extra-judicial killing”, while the stabilization phase should “develop legitimate and durable judicial institutions”. The normalization phase would “consolidate judicial institutions”.[28]

In the words of Garland Williams on the military role in post-conflict reconstruction, “former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for peace formally recognizes the peace consolidation activities that take place after a conflict. However, he provides only the following generic definition: ‘Action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’. This charge suggests a wide variety of actions that must be undertaken to promote sustainable peace and facilitate the extraction of military forces. Generals George Joulwan and Christopher Shoemaker, two former military officers with considerable peace operations experience, outline the ideal phases that every peacekeeping and peace-building operation should pass through: transformation, stabilization, and normalization. In the transformation phase, the terms of the peace agreement are initially translated to on-the-ground operations. There is the urgent task to introduce security forces rapidly to enforce the military aspects of the peace accord, quickly followed by several other steps: establish a legitimate government apparatus; install police, judicial, and penal systems; provide essential social services; and accelerate a return to productive economic activity. The primary thrust in the beginning of this transformation phase is for military or internal security forces to create a secure environment and ensure freedom of movement while longer-term civilian functions are set in motion.”[29]

Robert Orr addresses the challenges of weak, failed and defeated states in the 21st century. Nation-building and post-conflict reconstruction, in the age of “global terrorism, transnational crime networks, and border-hopping disease, state weakness and failure” was a real threat to Americans and their way of life.”[30] The United States needed to “re-energize its focus on weak, underdeveloped countries generally”. Significant improvements to “paltry, ineffective foreign assistance programs and improved trade regimes” were required if the United States was to “help address the needs of the vast majority of the world’s people, gain their support for the fight against terrorism, and provide them with the means to do something about it in their own countries”.[31]

In comparison to Holl, Orr highlights four instead of three phases during a post-conflict reconstruction process. Post-conflict reconstruction thus was a foreign policy tool that tried to “help local actors build up a minimally capable state in four key areas: security; governance and participation; social and economic well-being; and justice and reconciliation. Each of these distinct yet interrelated sets of tasks” constituted a “pillar of efforts to rebuild countries after conflict”.[32] For Orr, the security pillar addresses all aspects of public safety, while governance and participation is about the need for legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions. The third pillar of social and economic well-being should focus on the fundamental social and economic needs of a population, particularly the provision of emergency relief. Finally, the justice and reconciliation pillar was to provide an impartial and accountable legal system.[33]

In the aftermath of war against the Taliban in Afghanistan and war against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, we are left with the obvious question, to which extent theory that existed before September 11, 2001 was implemented to crisis management its aftermath? Perito concludes “as the United States pursues the global war on terrorism, the US military will be called upon to do more than hunt down terrorists and their protectors. It will continue to participate in peace operations, including those in countries where regimes that fostered terrorism have been replaced. The exit from such operations will demand a structured entry with a clear focus on establishing the rule of law and achieving sustainable security. In dealing with the security component of stability operations, America currently faces gaps in both force structure and political will. After September 11, the United States became very serious about fighting terrorism. It now needs to get equally serious about dealing with the security-related aspects of post-conflict reconstruction”.[34]

Orr’s analysis comes to a similar conclusion. It critically discusses America’s so-called capacity gaps. Despite a “long and deep history of involvement in post-conflict reconstruction efforts and growing demand over the last decade”, the United States had “failed to undertake a significant reform of its approach to and capabilities for post-conflict reconstruction”.[35] For all its ability to wage war, the US military was “unprepared to mount major stability operations and secure lasting peace”.[36] The US military had not been “prepared to do the job of post-conflict reconstruction”. It was not trained “for the types of duties it is now undertaking, it does not have the doctrine necessary, nor has it received a mandate to do the job”, Orr concludes in 2004. While the military can and should play an important role in nation-building and post-conflict reconstruction, civilian actors, such as non-governmental organizations or international and regional organizations or the private sector had a “comparative advantage in addressing many of the wide range of needs in post-conflict reconstruction”.[37] This so-called civilian capacity had unfortunately not been sufficiently made use of. More attention should be “paid to building up civilian capacities in a systematic way so that these actors’ natural comparative advantages can be marshaled in the struggle to rebuild countries”.[38]

A Department of Defense Directive of November 28, 2005 emphasizes stability operations and military support to stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR).[39] Integrated civilian and military efforts were “key to successful stability operations”. The Department of Defense therefore would be prepared to “work closely with relevant US Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global and regional organizations, US and foreign nongovernmental organizations, and private sector individuals and for-profit companies”.[40]

Following that line of argument, the Quadrennial Defense Review of February 2006 recognizes that “stability, security and transition operations can be critical to the long war on terrorism”.[41] Therefore, the Department of Defense “issued guidance in 2005 to place stability operations on par with major combat operations within the Department”.[42] The directive called for “improving the Department’s ability to work with interagency partners, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and others to increase capacities to participate in complex operations abroad. When implemented, the Department would be able to provide better support to civilian-led missions or to lead stabilization operations when appropriate”.[43]

As Jock Covey puts it, if peace operations are established based on a UN mandate, the UN Secretary-General usually selects a prominent international statesman to run the mission as its special representative to the Secretary General (SRSG).[44] The SRSG thus would become “the custodian of the intensely political process behind, for lack of any better name, the peace process”.[45] Covey argues that “success in achieving a viable peace will be determined, in part, by how adroitly the custodian guides the transformation of conflict among rivals in the postwar period”.[46]

2. NATO in the 21st Century – a Role Constantly Revised

A declaration on NATO transformation of October 6, 2002 stated the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) needed to be “capable of taking action whenever the security of its members was threatened, upon the basis of the United Nations Charter. By making it clear that there is no safe haven for those who would threaten our societies or for those who would harbor such people,” the deterrent element of Alliance strategy was strengthened. The North Atlantic Council should decide actions on a case-by-case basis. Where NATO as a whole was not engaged, allies willing to take action should be able to make use of NATO assets, procedures and practices. The declaration stressed high priority goals essential to the full range of Alliance missions including the defense against terrorism.[48] This new initiative was to be based on firm national commitments with specific target dates. National commitments should be made transparent for parliamentary monitoring and oversight. Priority should be given to projects maximizing multi-nationality, and which had the potential to become common NATO assets. NATO and European Union capabilities initiatives needed to be mutually reinforced and thoroughly harmonized through permanent co-ordination mechanisms and procedures in a spirit of openness. NATO should redouble its efforts to reduce the fragmentation of defense procurement efforts through the pooling of military capabilities, co-operative acquisition of equipment and common funding. It should reduce to a minimum the obstacles for the sharing of technology. The alliance had to be able to act wherever NATO’s interests were threatened, creating coalitions under NATO’s own mandate, as well as contributing to mission-based coalitions, concerning both, old and new threats. Former NATO General Secretary, Lord Robertson referred to the experience NATO had with post-conflict stabilization, such as in Kosovo and Macedonia. On October 8, 2002 Robertson declared, an enormous number of security issues on the Euro-Atlantic agenda required the greatest possible communication and coordination among Europeans and North Americans. The November 2002 Prague Summit covered a wide range from terrorism, NATO’s military command arrangements and headquarters structure, to a further development of Partnership. The most visible issues referred to enlargement and improvements to NATO’s military capabilities. The question of capabilities concerned the member countries of NATO and of the European Union. Because each nation had only one set of forces, it was necessary to make the best use possible of scarce resources, avoiding duplication and overlaps. The message was clear: the European Capabilities Action Plan and NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment needed to be coherent. Work in full transparency on capabilities issues was imperative, if EU-NATO impasse was to be avoided or ended. Finally, NATO’s Response Force should provide “a high-tech, flexible, rapidly deployable, interoperable and sustainable force, including land, sea, and air elements, capable of carrying out the full range of Alliance missions. The development of this high-readiness force will also serve as a catalyst for promoting improvements and greater interoperability in Alliance military capabilities to ensure their continuing transformation to meet evolving security challenges”. This concerned crisis management that increasingly in regions that would have been outside the North-Atlantic area during the Cold War.[53]

A core statement of NATO’s so-called transformation declaration of October 2002 emphasized that NATO would go global where the threat was – also based on UN resolutions.[54] By that, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization formally embraced so-called ‘out of area missions’.

What did this mean for specific case studies in recent years? While NATO took over the lead of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in 2003,[55] NATO supported the Polish contingent in Iraq. However, the crucial question remained, whether NATO as an organization would assume a larger peacekeeping role in Iraq? France, Germany under the previous government, Belgium and - after a change in government in Madrid in the spring of 2004 - also Spain, remained highly skeptical about NATO providing peacekeeping or police training within Iraq.[56] While Senator John Kerry in the US came out in support of a NATO role in post-war Iraq on April 30, 2004, President Bush outlined his Iraq vision on May 24, 2004, foreseeing both a UN mandate and a NATO role. [57] A range of security-related problems in post-war Iraq centered on the question, whether the US administration sufficiently planned for the post-conflict transition process. The corresponding challenges have also or mainly concerned the civil-military interface, which NATO and European-US allies seem to have managed better in the aftermath of war against Serbia and Montenegro in Kosovo in 1999. [58] Before the election of President Bush in November 2000, supporters of and advisors to the President expressed, the main aim of the US army was to win wars. [59] Would this mean that Americans were to win wars, while European allies would focus on ‘cleaning up’ afterwards? Can such an important distinction be sufficiently paraphrases as hard power vis-à-vis soft power? Is any such distinction helpful? On the other hand, should not the intrinsic and necessary link between so-called soft-power related security and hard-power related security, or the link between structural and operational security policy be emphasized?[60] In other words, security is the core challenge when nations or the international community try to protect and safeguard a long-term political transition process. Without enforcement of the rule of law and security, there is no lasting peace; without investing in education and cultural-political transformation, there will be no long-term peace, nor security. [61]

General Klaus Naumann, former chairman of NATO’s military committee emphasized the necessity to outline a new transatlantic vision, which links elements of collective defense with collective security. [62] A renewed NATO vision needed to comprise preventive elements as designed in the 1990s, but also deterrent aspects stemming from the Cold War period. Allies on both sides of the Atlantic shared more than values, and the long-term stabilization [and democratization] of the Middle East was in the national interest of allies in North America and Europe. The 2002 NATO Summit in Prague had provided a corner stone concerning the future of NATO. It was questionable, however, whether the summit in Istanbul would provide a definite answer about the role of NATO as an organization in post-war Iraq. [63]

A document titled ‘NATO Transformed’ highlights the following topics as corner stones on the transatlantic agenda:[64] Strengthening defense capabilities, changing role of NATO’s forces, opening the alliance to new members, forging new relations with Russia, establishing a distinctive partnership with Ukraine, engaging in dialogue with Mediterranean countries, peacekeeping and crisis management, responding to civil emergencies, and collaborating in science and environment.

With regard to the constantly changing role of NATO’s forces, “NATO’s new crisis-management and peace-support roles took on increasing importance from the mid-1990s. Between 1992 and 1995, NATO forces became involved in the Bosnian war in support of the United Nations, helping monitor and enforce UN sanctions in the Adriatic as well as the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina and providing close air support to the UN Protection Force on the ground. Air strikes, launched in August and September 1995 to lift the siege of Sarajevo, helped shift the balance of power and secure a peace settlement. NATO subsequently deployed a UN-mandated, multinational force to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement, in December 1995.”[65]

Then, in the spring of 1999, NATO’s crisis-management role had been “reinforced when the Allies launched an air operation against the Yugoslav regime to force it to comply with international demands to end political and ethnic repression in the province of Kosovo. A large NATO-led multinational force was sent in to help restore stability”[66]. It is important to recall that this mission was not based on a corresponding UN-mandate.

By early 2006, NATO agreed to extend its assistance to the African Union until September 2006. So far, the Alliance has been helping to airlift African Union peacekeepers in and out of Darfur and to train its forces.[67] Another option, already referred to in this paper, is the likely or potential NATO support for a possible UN-led peacekeeping mission in Darfur, after the mandate of the current African Union force will have ended in September 2006. With regard to Afghanistan, NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declared “Afghanistan remains our number one priority, and it is absolutely vital, both for the people of Afghanistan, and for NATO, that we are successful.”[68] The forthcoming NATO Summit at Riga in Latvia towards the end of November 2006 should mark the time by when NATO’s security presence in Afghanistan will have covered all of the country.[69] The Alliance in that sense planned to have up to 25.000 troops based in Afghanistan. At the present, NATO and its partner countries, such as members states of the European Union, who were not within NATO, had some 28.000 troops on operations and missions in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iraq and the Mediterranean, with the bulk in Afghanistan and Kosovo.[70]

During a meeting in Brussels on June 8, 2006, NATO defense ministers agreed on new so-called planning targets, for NATO countries to be able to conduct a greater number of smaller-scale operations than NATO has planned for in the past. According to an agreement called ‘Ministerial Guidance’, the Alliance’s so-called planning process “will be geared to ensuring that NATO can conduct a greater number of the more likely smaller-scale operations – a brigade or division level (up to 30.000 troops) – with less emphasis on the larger-scale operations – at corps level (up to 60.000).”[71]

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer emphasizes that NATO today was “fully alert to the possible escalation of local conflicts into broader security threats. In a globalized world, geographic distance no longer shields us from trouble.[72]” After the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 against the United States, “NATO’s unique crisis-management capabilities – including the NATO Response Force (NRF), the Alliance’s spearhead force – are of increasing importance to wider international security, since failed states have proved to be an ideal breeding ground for instability, terrorism and transnational crime”.[73]

Such developments seem to correspond with policy changes that have taken place in the United States, putting more emphasis on inter-agency cooperation with regard to (international) missions of stabilization and reconstruction.[74] A Presidential Directive on US Efforts for Reconstruction and Stabilization of December 14, 2005 established “that the Secretary of State shall coordinate and lead integrated US government efforts, involving all US Departments and Agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities”.[75] They also reflect trends within the United Nations and a renewed emphasis on peace-building.[76] The Peacebuilding Commission of the United Nations states for specific purposes: First, to “propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peace-building and recovery”; second, to “help ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and sustained investment over the medium- to longer-term”; third, to “extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict” crises; fourth, to “develop best practices on issues that require extensive collaboration among police, military, humanitarian and development actors”.[77]

So, where do above trends leave the transatlantic alliance, which is made up by member states of NATO and EU? EU for one is currently in charge of peacekeeping in the Balkans, has contributed to UN election monitoring in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and is spearheading - through EU and NATO members France and Italy – Europe’s contribution to the multinational peace force in Southern Lebanon. NATO on the other hand has been leading the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan and currently seems to be stretched too thin, given the violent resurgence of the Taliban in certain parts of Afghanistan. This may well have an impact on NATO’s envisioned stronger role in support to the African Union in Darfur, Sudan. While winning the war (against global terrorism) will not be possible without winning the peace in the long-term, this reality increasingly comes to a higher price to both Europeans and Americans![78]

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[1] ‘NATO in the 21st Century’, May 2004, www.nato.int/docu/home.htm; ‘Briefing: Helping Secure Afghanistan’ s Future’, January 2005, www.nato.int/docu/home.htm; ‘Briefing: Deploying Capabilities Faster and Further than Ever Before’, January 2005, www.nato.int/docu.home.htm; ‘President Discusses Democracy in Iraq with Freedom House’, Washington DC, March 29, 2006, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060329-6.html
[2] Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm, article 42: “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations”; 43: “All members to the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security”; Article 45: “In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee”; Article 47: “…1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament…”
[3] ‘NATO Transformed’, June 2004, www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/html_en/nato_trans03.html, page 35: “The need for a more coordinated Euro-Atlantic disaster-response capability led to the establishment at NATO headquarters, in June 1999, of a Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), based on a proposal made by Russia…”
[4] See United Nations Peacebuilding Commission, www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding; ‘Reform at the United Nations’, Reference Reports and Materials, www.un.org/reform/about-unreform.html; James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina (2005), The UN’ s Role in Nation-Building. From the Congo to Iraq (Rand Corporation: St. Monica. CA).
[5] Statement on Presidential Directive on U.S. Efforts for Reconstruction and Stabilization, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051214.html, December 14, 2005; National Strategy for Victory in Iraq, February 2005, whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html; Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic & Leonard R. Hawley (2005), The Quest for Viable Peace. International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation (USIP: Washington, DC); Michaela C. Hertkorn (2002), Why Conflict Prevention Does not Exclude the Use of Force (Mensch und Buch Verlag: Berlin), page 112: ‘Model on the Probability of Violent Conflict Escalation’, and page 133: ‘A Model for Preventing the Re-Emergence of Violence”; Pamela Aall, Daniel Miltenberger & Thomas G. Weiss (2000), Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations (USIP);
[6] For the definition of peace-building, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995), An Agenda for Peace. Second Edition with the New Supplement and Related UN Documents (United Nations: New York, NY). See also: James Notter & Louise Diamond, ‘Building Peace and Transforming Conflict’, Occasional Paper 7, October 1996, www.imtd.org: While conflict transformation described the outcome, peace-building described the actions. IMTD distinguishes ‘political peace-building’ from ‘structural’ and ‘social peace-building’. Political peace-building is about agreements and political arrangements, whereas structural peace-building created mid-level structures, such as institutions. Social peace-building is the missing link. It seeks to build the human infrastructure that can support political agreements and societal institutions.
[7] Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic & Leonard R. Hawley (2005), The Quest for Viable Peace. International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation (USIP: Washington, DC), page 78 – 79.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Covey et al, page 78 – 79.
[10] Ibid, page 79.
[11] Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-Georg Ehrhart (2006), Security Sector Reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (United Nations University Press), www.unu.edu/unupress/2005/securitysectorreform.html: “Military and police forces play a crucial role in the long-term success
[12] Craig Cohen, ‘Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction’, Special Report, March 2006, www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srs/srs1.html
[13] Ibid.
[14] With regard to USIP case study analysis and impact assessment, see also: Celeste J. Ward, ‘The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Governance in Iraq. Lessons Identified’, USIP Special Report, May 2005; Robert M. Perito, ‘The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq. Lessons Identified’, USIP Special Report, April 2005; ‘Building the Iraqi Special Tribunal. Lessons from Experiences in International Criminal Justice’, USIP Special Report, June 2004; Faleh A. Jabar, ‘Postconflict Iraq. A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy’, USIP Special Report, May 2004; ‘Building Civilian Capacity for US Stability Operations. The Rule of Law Component’, USIP Special Report, April 2004; ‘Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan’, USIP Special Report, March 2004; William Lewis, Edward Marks, and Robert Perito, ‘Enhancing International Civilian Police in Peace Operations, USIP Special Report, April 22, 2002;
[15] Robert M. Perito, ‘Where is the Lone Ranger when We Need Him?’ In: Ibid. America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force, edited by Robert Perito (USIP: Washington, DC), 2004, page 323.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Robert Perito, 2004, page 323: “…’The US cannot be unprepared for missions it does not want, as if the lack of preparedness might prevent our going. We cannot be like children who refuse to get dressed for school’…”
[18] Ibid, page 324.
[19] Michaela Hertkorn (2002), Why Conflict Prevention Does Not Exclude the Use of Force (Mensch & Buch Verlag: Berlin), page 126: “… The model above focuses on two types of potential activities by a variety of actors or tracks in the wider field of conflict prevention: First, short-term (military) intervention to stop violence, aggression and genocide; second, long-term transformation of a so-called conflict-habituated system into a peace system with a partnership culture. These two types of potential activities pose challenges to a whole variety of actors dealing with conflict prevention, which will be explained in the following. First, with the help of Bruce Jentleson’s coercive prevention approach, and a ‘model for preventing the re-emergence of violence’, designed by Jane Holl. Second, with a so-called ‘model to transform conflicts’ defined by the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy. The following quote highlights to which degree or extent the two elements of intervention and transformation are linked in theory and practice. In the words of John McDonald, ‘the so-called exit strategy the US military keeps talking about and looking for, will only work, when the departing US troops are able to leave behind a peaceful community’.”
[20] ‘Civil Affairs: Reflections of the Future’ (prepared remarks by H. Allen Holmes, assistant secretary of defense for special operations at the Worldwide Civil Affairs Conference, Chicago, June 6, 1997), vol. 12, number 31, www.defenselink.mil/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=736, page 2 and 3.
[21] Robert Perito (2004), page 325.
[22] Perito, page 326.
[23] Perito, page 336.
[24] Ibid, page 336.
[25] Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report with Executive Summary (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and Carnegie Corporation of New York: Washington, DC and New York, NY), 1997; Preventing Deadly Conflict. Executive Summary of the Final Report (Carnegie Commission: New York, NY), page 7: operational prevention: strategies in the face of crisis; structural prevention: strategies to address the root causes of deadly conflict: security, well-being, justice, page 19. Michaela C. Hertkorn (2002), page 133; Jane Holl, ‘Konfliktprävention. Strategien zur Verhinderung Ethnischer Zwietracht’, Internationale Politik, 9/1999, page 41;
[26] Hertkorn (2002), page 133.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Garland H. Williams (2005), Engineering Peace. The Military Role in Post-Conflict Reconstruction (USIP: Washington, DC), page 14 – 15.
[30] Robert C. Orr (2004), Winning the Peace. An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Center for Strategic and International Studies: Washington, DC), page 9.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid, page 11.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Perito, 2004, page 337.
[35] Orr 2004, page 14.
[36] Ibid, page 14 and 15: “Although the Bush administration came to office concerned about the overuse of the military, it has rapidly accelerated the tendency to use the military as the primary instrument for post-conflict reconstruction. During the 2000 campaign, candidate Bush cautioned: ‘I would be very careful about using our troops as nation-builders. I believe the role of the military is to fight and win war…’ Even after the terrorist attacks on the US …, official attitudes in the Bush administration toward nation-building changed only slowly. President Bush himself continued to demonstrate his unease with the concept and the term… By mid-2003, President Bush had deployed significant numbers of forces in Iraq (150.000 coalition, including 130.000 US) and Afghanistan (6.000 NATO and 9.000 US) where they became deeply enmeshed in fundamental nation-building efforts, remaining in both places in similar quantities for more than a year despite plans to scale back dramatically. In addition, the Bush administration maintained significant force levels in two ongoing nation-building projects: Bosnia (13.000 NATO, including 3.000 US) and Kosovo (20.000 NATO, including 1.500 US).”
[37] Orr, 2004, page 15.
[38] Ibid.
[39] ‘Department of Defense Directive’, number 3000.05, November 28, 2005, www.dtic.mil.whs/directives; ‘Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization’, www.defenselink.mil; ‘Statement on Presidential Directive on US Efforts for Reconstruction and Stabilization’, December 14, 2005, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051214.html.
[40] Ibid, page 3.
[41] ‘Quadrennial Defense Review Report’, February 6, 2006, page 86, www.defneselink.mil
[42] Ibid; ‘Stabilization and Reconstruction of Nation-States: How to Deal with Security and Challenges of the 21st Century’ (panel discussion with Ambassador John McDonald, Erik Leklem and Michaela Hertkorn, School of Diplomacy, Seton Hall University, March 23, 2006). One observation of the panel was that the Quadrennial Defense Review of early 2006 put equal emphasis on stability operations and combat operations. This was also a result of the experience in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Jock Covey, ‘The Custodian of the Peace Process’, in: Covey, Dziedzic & Hawley, The Quest for Viable Peace, USIP, 2005.
[45] Ibid, page 77.
[46] Ibid.
[48] ‘NATO Transformed’, June 2004, www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/html_en/nato_trans03.html www.nato.int, page 11: “Several initiatives were taken at Prague to enhance the Alliance’s capabilities against terrorism and other new security threats. A military concept for defense against terrorism was endorsed. Cooperation has also been launched with Partner countries in the form of an Action Plan against Terrorism to exchange intelligence and to improve civil preparedness against possible chemical, biological or radiological attacks against civilian populations and to help deal with their consequences…”
[53] ‘NATO Transformed’, June 2004, www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/html_en/nato_trans03.html, page 10: “Following a first force-generation conference in July 2003, a prototype force was launched in October 2003. An initial operational capability is expected to be ready by October 2004 and the force is due to be fully operational by October 2006. It will then number some 21.000 troops and have dedicated cutting-edge fighter aircraft, ships, army vehicles, combat service support, logistics, communications, and intelligence. It will be able to deploy to a crisis area within five days and sustain itself for 30 days.”
[54] United Nations Charter, Art. 43, calls for a ‘stand-by force’. Art. 45 calls for a ‘stand-by air force’. Art. 47 calls for a ‘military staff committee’.
[55] ‘NATO Transformed’, 2004, page 13: “NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan is the Alliance’s first mission beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. It reflects the seminal decision taken by Allied foreign ministers meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002, that ‘NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, sustain operations over distance and time’. Moreover, following the US-led intervention against Saddam Hussein’s regime, NATO has agreed to support the Polish-led multinational division in central Iraq with force generation, logistics, communications and intelligence. It is prepared to offer similar support to other Allies that request it.” ‘Eurokorps für Afghanistan vorgesehen’, www.bundeswehr.de/wir/einsatz/ (16 May, 2004); ‘NATO Takes over Afghanistan Command’, BBC News, August 11, 2006.
[56] ‘Summit Meetings of Heads of State and Governments’, Istanbul, Turkey, June 28 – 29, 2006, www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/04/0483.htm
[57] ‘This Moment in Iraq is a Moment of Truth’, Remarks by Senator John Kerry, Westminster College, Fulton, MI, April 30, 2004; ‘President Outlines Steps to Help Iraq Achieve Democracy and Freedom’, Remarks by the President on Iraq and the War on Terror, United States Army War College, Carlisle, PA, May 24, 2004; ‘Iraqis to Have Veto over Troops’, BBC News, May 25, 2004; ‘Fresh Iraq Plan Awaits UN Verdict’, BBC News, June 2, 2004; ‘Text: Iraq Draft Resolution’, BBC News, June 2, 2004’; ‘UN Envoy Defends Iraq Government’, BBC News, June 2, 2004.
[58] Michaela Hertkorn (2002), page 116 – 139.
[59] Paula J. Dobriansky and David B. Rivkin, Washington Post, January 30, 2001; Michaela C. Hertkorn, ‘The Relevance of Perceptions in Foreign Policy: A German – US Perspective’, World Affairs, fall 2001, page 63: “The critical question seems to be whether a common European security and defense policy can become more than a reflection of European concern in the aftermath of Kosovo. Is the creation of ESDP – as formulated at the Cologne EU summit of July 1999 and the Nice summit of December 2000 – an attempt to counterbalance US power, while theoretically facing the challenge of coercive prevention? Paula Dobriansky and David Rivkin stated that the ‘United States can and must maintain a first-rate military establishment capable of fighting and winning wars. President Bush articulated this fundamental truth in stating that the core US strategic mission is to deter war by preparing to win swiftly and decisively’.”
[60] ‘NATO-EU: A Strategic Partnership’, February 10, 2004, www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/indext.html; ‘First EU-NATO Crisis Management Exercise (CME/CMX 03), November 11, 2003, www.nato.int
[61] Michaela Hertkorn, Why German – US Relations Still Matter to the Transatlantic Alliance – One Year after War in Iraq, DIAS Analysis, Nr. 7, August 2004.
[62] ‘NATO at the Crossroads – The Prospects for Success at the Istanbul Summit’, Speech by General (ret.) Klaus Naumann, former Chariman of the NATO Military Committee, Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, Washington, D. C., 30 April, 2004.
[63] Richard Bernstein and Mark Landler, ‘German Leader to Oppose Sending NATO Troops to Iraq’, New York Times, 21 May, 2004; Jeffrey Gedmin, ‘An Orgy of Anti-Americanism. They Hate Us. They Really, Really Hate Us’, Weekly Standard, 24 May, 2004.
[64] ‘NATO Transformed’, June 2004, www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/html_en/nato_trans03.html .
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] ‘UN Humanitarian Envoy Visits NATO’, NATO Update, May 30, 2006, www.nato,int/docu/update/2006/05-may/e0530a.htm
[68] ‘NATO Parliamentarians Get Preview of Riga Summit’, NATO Update, May 31, 2006, www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/05-may/e0531a.htm
[69] Ibid.
[70] ‘NATO Sets New Level of Ambition for Operations’, NATO Update, June 8, 2006, www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/06-june/e0608b.htm; ‘NATO Reconfirms Afghanistan Expansion’, NATO Update, June 8, 2006, www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/06-june/e0608a.htm; ‘Afghanistan: ISAF-Truppen töten vor Besuch Steinmeiers Dutzende Taliban’, DIE WELT, August 21, 2006, www.welt.de/data/2006/08/21/1004569.html?prx=1; Joachim Schlucht, ‘Steinmeiers schwierige Mission in einem Land Abgrund. Immer mehr Afghanen sehen in den Taliban ihre Beschützer’, Schwarzwälder Bote, 21. August 2006.
[71] ‘NATO Sets New Level of Ambition for Operations’, NATO Update, June 8, 2006, www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/06-june/e0608b.htm
[72] ‘Building Peace and Stability in Crisis Regions’, NATO Crisis Management Briefing, September 2005, www.nato.int
[73] Ibid, page 2.
[74] Natural disasters, especially in 2005, such as the Tsunami in South East Asia and Hurricane Katrina in the United States, have further highlighted the need of rapid military deployment capabilities to crisis regions. James Dobbins et al. (2003), America’s Role in Nation-Building. From Germany to Iraq (Rand).
[75] ‘Statement on Presidential Directive on US Efforts to Reconstruction and Stabilization’, December 14, 2005, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051214.html
[76] The United Peacebuilding Commission was established in December 2005, www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding; James Dobbins et al. (2005), The UN’s Role in Nation-Building. From the Congo to Iraq (Rand), www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG304/
[77] Ibid.
[78] ‘The European Union in the World. Abroad Be Dangers’, Economist, August 26, 2006; President Bush Addresses United Nations General Assembly’, New York, September 19, 2006, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/print/20060919-4.html